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WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 32 (2009) IRRESPONSIBLE LENDING WITH A BETTER INFORMED
LENDER*
Roman Inderst
We present a simple model of personal ﬁnance in which an incumbent lender has an information
advantage vis-  a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer
surplus, a lender with sufﬁcient market power may engage in irresponsible lending, approving
credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well
informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free
ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.
This article proposes a new framework for analysing household (or consumer) lending.
Using its past experience with borrowers in the same local area or borrowers facing
similar economic conditions, a sophisticated lender may often have a better estimate of
a household’s default probability than the household itself. I derive the conditions
where such information asymmetry can lead to irresponsible (or too aggressive
lending), in which case credit is approved even though this is knowingly against a
household’s best interest.
1
Admittedly, the more standard approach is to assume that borrowers represent the
better informed party. While we do not want to dismiss the importance of borrower
adverse selection, the presumption that sophisticated and experienced lenders can
estimate the default probability better than individual borrowers may be particularly
suitable if borrowers are households. Individual households may not have statistically
accurate information about the likelihood of, say, losing their job in an economic
downturn or of incurring large medical bills in the future, both of which may cause
them to default on a loan.
2 On the other hand, we do not presume that households
own estimates are biased on average.
I borrow the assumption of informed lending from Inderst and Mu ¨ller (2006),
where a lender is better informed about the expected cash ﬂow from a newly
ﬁnanced project. My current analysis is tailored, instead, towards household ﬁnance
and my focus is on whether too aggressive lending can occur in equilibrium. This
focus is motivated by the particular attention that policy makers have given to this
issue. For instance, in the UK various reports and taskforces on consumer lending
practices (and, more generally, on the surge of household debt) have brought up
* I thank two anonymous referees and, in particular, the editor, Leonardo Felli, for very helpful comments.
A previous version of this article was circulated under the title Consumer Lending when Lenders are More
Sophisticated Than Households. I also thank seminar participants at the Bank of England, the European
University Institute and Lancaster University.
1 The term irresponsible lending is commonly used in the UK, along with aggressive lending and
predatory lending, though to a lesser extent.
2 Based on survey evidence, Dick and Lehnert (2006) point out that medical problems, followed by divorce
and unemployment, are the main causes for personal bankruptcies in the US.
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3 In addition, the Financial Service Authority, the
UK’s main ﬁnancial regulator, has recently undertaken a number of investigations
into the misselling of ﬁnancial products, amongst them certain kinds of mortgage
products.
4
Concerns about predatory or abusive lending are equally widespread in the US.
5
Among the criteria that Engel and McCoy (2004) suggest, the criterion that lending is
predatory or abusive if the respective loan does not result in a net beneﬁt to the
borrower is closest to the one that I formalise in my model. I deﬁne lending as being
too aggressive if, given the information that is available to the lender, an approved loan
is against the household’s interest.
In my model, an incumbent lender is in a better position to estimate a potential
borrower’s default probability than either competitors or the household itself. When
the incumbent lender is relatively unconstrained by competition, I ﬁnd that too
aggressive lending can arise even if households perfectly anticipate that the lender is
better informed and that he will use his information to his own advantage. Too
aggressive lending arises out of the lender’s attempt to extract more of the consumer
surplus. However, once competition forces the lender to leave households with a suf-
ﬁciently high level of surplus, the incumbent lender will no longer be too aggressive.
On the contrary, he may now be too conservative. However I put these results into
perspective below by discussing how the introduction of lenders own agency problem
may lead to a qualiﬁcation of our benchmark.
In light of the ongoing debate about the nature and implications of too aggressive or
irresponsible lending, my article thus offers the following contributions. First and
possibly most importantly, I show that too aggressive lending can be perfectly
rationalised as an equilibrium outcome even if households do not err on average and
even if they are not systematically deceived by lenders. Second, my model points to a
potential source of too aggressive lending: the information advantage of a lender with
market power. However, my model also shows that increased competition from less
informed lenders may reduce welfare both because it may make the incumbent lender
too conservative and because entrants attempt to free-ride on the incumbent’s superior
screening skills.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. In Section 1 I review the related
literature. Section 2 introduces the model, which is analysed in Section 3. Section 4
contains a discussion and a comparative analysis, while Section 5 analyses the free-
riding problem. Section 6 concludes.
3 As a remedy, the Grifﬁths Commission (2005) proposed the introduction of a Statutory Bank Customers
Charter, which would replace the Voluntary Banking Code, to which banks now subscribe in the UK. The
report by the Department of Trade and Industry Fair, Clear and Competitive – The Consumer Credit Market
in the 21st Century (DTI, 2005) led to the new Consumer Credit Bill, which will include a deﬁnition of unfair
lending and provisions for how consumers can challenge supposedly unfair agreements.
4 At the level of the European Union, the new Consumer Credit Directive was adopted in 2004 with the aim
of harmonising European legislation and protecting consumers better in their credit transactions.
5 For instance, Elliehausen et al. (2005) offer a detailed account of cases and policy responses to potentially
abusive mortgage lending practices in the US. At the time of revising this article, many observers linked the
ongoing crisis in the US subprime mortgage market to predatory lending practices.
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My article relates to the extant literature on household ﬁnance; see, for instance, Hynes
and Posner (2002) or White (2005) for recent overviews. This literature has identiﬁed a
number of possible imperfections in the market for credit. In addition to the potential
for private information and moral hazard on the part of the borrower, there has also
been considerable emphasis on households limited understanding of the nature and
details of ﬁnancial products. As discussed by Beales et al. (1981), for instance, one
cannot rely on ﬁrms to inform and educate consumers properly.
6
As noted above, my model employs the informed lending framework of Inderst and
Mu ¨ller (2006). There, the lender’s superior information relates to the distribution of
the perfectly veriﬁable cash ﬂow from a newly ﬁnanced project. Consequently, the
article’s focus is on the optimal design of the ﬁnancial security. While the possibility of
both too conservative and too aggressive lending has already been recognised there,
this article differs from it in a number of aspects. In the current model, the presence of
(deadweight) costs of personal bankruptcy can make a lender’s credit policy too
aggressive from the point of overall efﬁciency. Moreover, the possibility that a lender
can be too conservative follows from the fact that a household may strategically default,
which is not a possibility in Inderst and Mu ¨ller (2006). The problem of free-riding
identiﬁed is also novel.
This article and Bond et al. (2005) share two key assumptions from Inderst and
Mu ¨ller (2006), namely that of imperfect competition among lenders and that of an
information advantage vis-  a-vis borrowers. As in the present article, the main result in
Bond et al. (2005) is that the combination of these two features can give rise to
predatory lending, to use their US-focused terminology. My analysis differs, however,
in the following aspects. I show that more effective competition, which I model in this
case by a change in the sequence of moves, is not always beneﬁcial if it does not go
together with a reduction in the incumbent lender’s information advantage. There are
two reasons for this. First, competition can give rise to too conservative lending.
Second, we show that the possibility of free-riding by less informed lenders may make
it unproﬁtable or even impossible for the informed lender to use his better information
to screen borrowers.
Moreover, in my basic model the (deadweight) loss from default arises from personal
costs of bankruptcy such as lawyers fees or higher future borrowing costs; see Section 2
for a more detailed list. In contrast, in Bond et al. (2005), personal bankruptcy reduces
welfare through the seizure of collateralised assets. However, as I show in Section 4.2,
unless personal assets are sufﬁciently lumpy or otherwise non-exempt in my model,
too aggressive lending would no longer arise once the extent of collateralisation
represents a contractual variable.
7
Only a few other papers have used a framework where lenders are more informed or
more sophisticated. In Manove et al. (2001) banks can add value by screening out bad
6 The issue that lenders may exhibit insufﬁcient care or may even deceive consumers when selling their
products is possibly the one that has received most attention from policy makers, e.g., in the US through the
Truth in Lending Act or in the EU through the recently adopted Consumer Credit Directive.
7 There are also differences in the technical analysis between the two papers. While in the present article
contracts are designed before private information is observed, Bond et al. (2005) follow the analysis in
Villeneuve (2005) and consider a signalling game.
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and Habib and Johnsen (2000), informed investors bring valuable information to a ﬁrm.
More related to the household ﬁnance context, in Bolton et al. (2003), ﬁnancial advisors
know better which products are suitable for households with different investment needs.
Other papers have assumed that, in contrast to the ﬁrm’s owner, a lender is more
sophisticated, as he does not suffer from behavioural biases such as overconﬁdence or
optimism, e.g. de Meza and Southey (1996) and Landier and Thesmar (forthcoming).
Finally, it has been recognised in both empirical and theoretical work that due to
bounded rationalityand costs of search and decision making, borrowerscanmakeerrors
and are prone to be misled and deceived by lenders; see, e.g., Woodward (2003).
2. The Model
I consider a single household that wants to ﬁnance the purchase of an indivisible good
with a loan. The household has zero initial wealth. The required expenditure, which
for the moment is also equal to the size of the loan, is given by l > 0. There are three
points of time in our model: t ¼ 0, 1, and 2. The good must be purchased in t ¼ 0. In
t ¼ 1, the household realises a random income y, which for simplicity can only be equal
to either y ¼ 0o ry ¼   y > 0. Throughout the article I take   y to be sufﬁciently large to
cover the contractually stipulated repayment.
For the moment, I also stipulate that the lender is a monopolist. One justiﬁcation for
this is that too aggressive lending has often been associated with market segments
where there is little competition. For instance, Engel and McCoy (2004) explicitly
mention the lack of competition in what are often spatially segmented local markets for
subprime lending as one of the major culprits for abusive or predatory lending prac-
tices. Further below I consider competition between a better informed (incumbent)
lender and other, less informed lenders.
In t ¼ 1 the household may make a repayment to the lender. I make the somewhat
extreme assumption, though it is quite standard in the personal ﬁnance literature, that
future income cannot be credibly pledged. Hence, any positive repayment must be
enforced by the threat of default. For instance, in the US until October 2005 debtors
had the choice between ﬁling for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.
Under Chapter 7, debtors were not obliged to use future earnings to repay existing
debt.
8 Even if a country’s bankruptcy code does not specify such a generous exemption,
my analysis may be fully applicable to borrowers whose earnings are hard to verify,
given the nature of their profession or the lack of regular work. Incidentally, the
constraint arising from the assumption that not (all) income can be credibly pledged
for repayment will not be binding whenever lending is too aggressive but only when the
lender is too conservative.
As the good does not yield consumption beneﬁts beyond t ¼ 2, the assumption that
all repayment must be made in t ¼ 1 is not restrictive. The utility derived from the good
8 Strictly speaking, while creditors were generally able to obtain a court order to garnish debtors wages up
to a certain limit, the debtor could gain protection from these orders by ﬁling for bankruptcy. Though the
100% exemption of post-bankruptcy earnings (the fresh start) is quite extreme, partial exemptions of future
earnings are quite typical under other bankruptcy codes, in particular since many countries have reformed
their laws over the last two decades; see Tabb (2005) for an overview.
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must be made the household derives the utility au, where a   0. Typically, one may
think of a as being (relatively) small, unless the loan is meant to ﬁnance immediate
consumption. Unlike mortgages, I suppose that the loan ﬁnances the purchase of some
household equipment.
Both the lender and the household are risk neutral. I set the risk-neutral interest rate
to zero. In my model, the purpose of the loan is thus not to smooth consumption but to
ﬁnance the purchase of a long-lived good. Without the purchase in t ¼ 0, the respective
consumption beneﬁts are lost.
A crucial feature in my model is that the household incurs some additional costs
c > 0 when defaulting. For instance, Fay et al. (2002) list the loss of other (non-exempt)
assets as well as payment of bankruptcy court ﬁling fees and lawyers fees as ﬁnancial
costs from bankruptcy. In addition, non-pecuniary costs include the cost of acquiring
information about the bankruptcy process, higher future borrowing costs, and the cost
of bankruptcy stigma (Fay et al., 2002, p. 707).
A contract stipulates that in t ¼ 1 the household repays the principal l together with
interest rl. In what follows, it will be more convenient though to work instead with the
total repayment requirement R :¼ l(1 þ r). As future income cannot be credibly
pledged, the loan contract can stipulate an incentive compatible repayment up to
9
R   u þ c: ð1Þ
I now come to the core feature of my model: the lender’s information advantage
vis-  a-vis the borrower. During the credit approval process the lender privately learns of
the household’s type h 2 H ¼½ h;  h . The type h 2 Q determines the probability p(h)
with which the household subsequently realises high income. Types are ordered such
that high types have a strictly lower probability of subsequent default, 1   p(h). Also, it
is convenient to assume that p(h) is continuous and that p(h) ¼ 0 and pð  hÞ¼1.
From an ex ante perspective, types h have the distribution function F(h), which is
atomless and has the continuous density f(h) > 0 over h 2 Q. Hence, from an ex ante
perspective the household will realise high income with probability
p :¼ E½pðhÞjh 2 H ¼
Z   h
h
pðhÞf ðhÞdh:
This coarse information is all the household has. The more precise information that
comes from observing the type h is the lender’s private (proprietary) information.
As discussed in the Introduction, the assumption that a sophisticated lender may be
in a better position to estimate a borrower’s probability of default should be particu-
larly reasonable when borrowers are households (instead of corporations). As a par-
ticular example, take the case of the home credit market in the UK. One key feature of
this market is the close contact between a household and the lender. This is fostered
through frequent collection of instalments, sometimes even weekly, which should
substantially reduce the importance of private information on the side of the house-
hold, e.g., related to the employment status or health status of household members. On
9 It should be noted that I treat c as being exogenous, which is different from papers that study the optimal
design of personal bankruptcy procedures and statutes, such as Wang and White (2000).
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home credit market are large, internationally active public companies with thousands
of representatives in the ﬁeld. As these lenders will clearly mine their own data base and
use statistical information when designing their offers, they should have some infor-
mation advantage vis-  a-vis their unsophisticated, often relatively uneducated, clientele.
Before proceeding with the analysis, I provide some comments on my choice of
simple loan contracts. The restriction to offering only a single contract R instead of
a menu is without loss of generality as after observing h, the lender would always
strictly prefer to pick the contract with the highest repayment requirement.
10 By the
same token, it will also be immediate that the optimal contract would not be
renegotiated, given that an increase or decrease in R would invariably hurt one of
the parties.
The ﬁnal restriction is that after a failure to repay R the loan will be foreclosed with
probability one. It can be shown that this restriction on the feasible contractual set only
binds if the lender becomes too aggressive, in which case the condition of no strategic
default in (1) also does not bind. Here, the lender may want to reduce the burden
imposed on a defaulting household as this in turn allows him to raise the required
repayment R, while still satisfying the (yet to be formalised) ex ante participation con-
straint of the borrower. In a sense, this thereby allows the two contracting parties to
negotiate around the existing personal bankruptcy provisions, as captured by the cost
parmameter c . In addition, specifying that a borrower may only be forced into personal
bankruptcy with a well-deﬁned and strictly positive probability may be difﬁcult to
implement, in particular if the lender resells the loan and the ultimate holder may thus
not be in close contact with the borrower.
11
3. Analysis
3.1. The Lender’s Loan Policy
If granted credit, the household will repay R after realising high income in t ¼ 1. In the
case of low income, the household will default at private costs of c. Hence, if the lender
approves credit after observing h, the household’s expected net utility from receiving a
loan is given by
UðhÞ :¼ au þ pðhÞðu   RÞ ½ 1   pðhÞ c:
Likewise, the lender’s expected net proﬁts from approving credit after observing h
are
VðhÞ :¼ pðhÞR   l:
Note that the deﬁnition of V(h) does not take into account any possible resale value
for the seized good. Observe next that V(h) is continuous and strictly increasing given
10 The choice of deterministic menus is, however, restrictive. More generally, a menu, from which the
lender picks a contract after observing h, could be made incentive compatible by stipulating different
probabilities of subsequently concluding a contract. However, if the respective lottery prescribed not
concluding a contract, this would typically not be renegotiation proof.
11 With an arbitrarily small but strictly positive resale value of the repossessed good it is clearly ex post
optimal in my model for a lender to force the borrower into bankruptcy.
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be approved, there thus exists a unique threshold h < h
  <   h where V(h ) ¼ 0, imply-
ing that the lender optimally approves credit if and only if h   h . Clearly, h  depends
on R, though in what follows I choose to only make this dependency explicit whenever
this is necessary to avoid ambiguity.
Before I proceed with the analysis of the market equilibrium, I discuss the bench-
mark of maximising total surplus, in which case the loan should be approved if
u½a þ pðhÞ    ½1   pðhÞ c þ l; ð2Þ
i.e., if the expected consumption beneﬁt is at least equal to the expected costs of
bankruptcy plus the initial expenditure l. I refer to this benchmark as the second-best
benchmark. Clearly, if u(1 þ a) > l holds (which is what I will assume below), then
from c > 0 it would be ﬁrst-best optimal always to approve credit and to never let the
household default.
To reduce the number of case distinctions but without losing any insights, I want to
ensure that it is sometimes but not always (second-best) efﬁcient to grant credit, i.e.,
that (2) holds only for sufﬁciently high values of h. This is the case if
au   c < l < uð1 þ aÞ: ð3Þ
In this case, I obtain a unique interior second-best cutoff h < hSB <   h from (2): credit
should be approved if and only if h   hSB. Under a total welfare standard, the lender is
thus too aggressive if h  < hSB, implying that credit is granted too often, and too conser-
vative if h  > hSB, implying that credit is denied too often. Below I will also discuss a
standard of consumer surplus.
3.2. Loan Policy in Equilibrium
Anticipating the lender’s (privately) optimal choice of h , the household’s expected
utility is
E½UðhÞjh   h
   :¼
Z   h
h
UðhÞ
f ðhÞ
1   Fðh
 Þ
dh: ð4Þ
Optimally, the lender now offers a repayment requirement R that maximises his ex-
pected payoff
V :¼
Z   h
h
  VðhÞf ðhÞds
subject to the household’s participation constraint
E½UðhÞjh   h
   0: ð5Þ
To solve the model, I must now distinguish between three different cases. In the ﬁrst
case, the consumption beneﬁts obtained before the repayment is due, au, are not too
high as
au < c: ð6Þ
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default (which is not the case in my model) would still prefer to take out a loan as the
maximum punishment in case of defaulting, c, does not exceed the early consumption
beneﬁts au.
If au < c holds, as in condition (6), then the lender can increase R until the
household’s participation constraint (5) binds. Moreover, to satisfy (5) the household
must realise a strictly positive net utility when income is high and the good is not
repossessed. Note next that as the expected default probability is lower for high h, U(h)
is strictly increasing in h. From these two results, namely that, ﬁrst, (5) binds under the
optimal contract and that, second, U(h) is strictly increasing, it is then immediate that
U(h ) < 0 and thus, together with V(h ) ¼ 0, that h  < hSB. Under the optimal contract
the lender is thus too aggressive.
Putting it somewhat differently, if the household could share the lender’s informa-
tion, then for all h   h  that are close to h  the household would strictly prefer not to
borrow, though the lender ﬁnds it optimal to approve credit.
The two remaining cases to consider are the case where au ¼ c holds with equality,
for which h  ¼ hSB, and the case where au > c, for which the lender becomes too
conservative as h  > hSB. To see the intuition for the last case, recall that the maximum
that the lender can extract in case of high income is R ¼ u þ c. For any higher R the
household would (strategically) choose to default even after high income as the utility
from non-defaulting, u   R, is strictly below the costs of defaulting c. Where au > c,
the household’s participation constraint (5) then remains slack and the lender’s credit
approval decision is too conservative.
Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium. If au < c holds, then the lender grants
credit to households even though this reduces total surplus and is knowingly against their best
interest. For au > c, the lender is instead too conservative, while lending is (second-best) efﬁcient
if au ¼ c.
At this point it should be noted that granting a loan against the household’s
interest as U(h) < 0 does not necessarily imply that this is inefﬁcient. Conversely,
while a loan is efﬁcient when h > hSB holds, it may still make the household worse
off. For the most interesting case with au < c, I can formalise these observations as
follows. Given continuity and strict monotonicity of U(h), there exists some type
hSB < h
0 <   h such that the household would strictly prefer not to be granted credit for
all h 2 [h , h0). Whether one would describe the lender as being too aggressive for all
h 2 (hSB, h0) depends thus on whether one applies a consumer standard or a total
welfare standard.
In essence, the ﬁnding in Proposition 1 that lending can be too aggressive is the
consequence of a monopoly pricing problem. In order to extract the household’s
surplus fully, the lender offers a contract that subsequently makes it optimal to ap-
prove credit even against the household’s best interest. The lender thereby extracts
(in expectation) the surplus that the household makes when there is no default.
Extracting the household’s surplus in this way is, however, not welfare neutral. As h  is
pushed down below hSB, total welfare is lower than in the (second-best) benchmark
case.
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Proposition 1 it follows that lending is more likely to be too aggressive if the utility
derived from the purchased good is more back-loaded relative to the repayment
schedule, which in my model is concentrated on t ¼ 1. This could be more likely if the
loan ﬁnances the purchase of relatively long-lived consumer goods or residential
property. Also, too aggressive lending is more likely if the costs of personal bankruptcy,
c, are higher.
Corollary 1 The lender is more likely to be too aggressive if personal costs of bankruptcy are
higher or if the consumption beneﬁts from the purchased good are more back-loaded.
4. Discussion and Comparative Analysis
4.1. An Explanation of Additional Cash Advances
In my model, where there are no preferences for smoothing consumption over time,
the household has no need to borrow more than l. Still I ﬁnd that advancing additional
cash, a > 0, can be optimal for the lender. Casual evidence suggests that such cash-in-
advance loans are indeed common for (ﬁrst or second) mortgages or purchases of
durable goods, at least in the UK.
Clearly, advancing a above the purchase price l can only be optimal for the lender if
the borrower will then still refrain from strategically defaulting in the case of high
income. Moreover, even if the lender could tie the loan l þ a to the purchase of the
good, realistically he may now risk attracting borrowers who have only a low value u for
the good and thus already anticipate strategically defaulting later. With this limitation
in mind, the following result should thus be seen more as a hypothetical benchmark.
Proposition 2. If it is possible to advance more than l, namely l þ a, and if the lender is
otherwise too aggressive, it is optimal to choose a > 0. If this is feasible, then by setting a ¼ c the
second best can be achieved.
Intuitively, by jointly increasing a and R, the loan contract smooths out the difference
between the borrower’s (net) utility when having high income and thus repaying the
loan, u þ a   R, and when having low income and thus defaulting, a   c. This reduces
the household’s (consumer) surplus while at the same time implementing a higher,
more efﬁcient cutoff h . Though as discussed above this may not always be realistic, the
lender can thereby even ensure that the second best is achieved with h  ¼ hSB. Intu-
itively, this is the case if the lender sets a just equal to the personal bankruptcy costs c
while choosing R ¼ u þ c, which taken together ensures that for all h it holds that
U(h) ¼ 0.
4.2. Borrowing Against the Household’s Assets
Households costs of bankruptcy could also arise as some assets must be sold below
their respective value to the household. I ﬁrst assume that the level of collateralisation
can be freely chosen. Hence, the contract can now specify that in case of default the
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With assets of intrinsic value c at stake in case of default, the household’s utility is now
UðhÞ¼au þ pðhÞðu   RÞ ½ 1   pðhÞ ðc þ cÞ;
while the lender’s payoff is
VðhÞ¼pðhÞR þ½ 1   pðhÞ bc   l:
Moreover, for given c it is now second-best efﬁcient to approve credit whenever
u½a þ pðhÞ    ½1   pðhÞ ½c þ cð1   bÞ  þ l;
which takes into account that the value c(1   b) is destroyed when liquidating the
assets. This gives the following results.
Proposition 3. Suppose that it is possible to back a loan with some of the borrower’s
(otherwise exempt) assets and that the respective collateral c can be freely chosen. Then if the lender
is too aggressive at c ¼ 0 (i.e., if au < c), it is uniquely optimal to set c ¼ 0. Instead, if the lender
is too conservative at c ¼ 0 (i.e., if au > c), then the optimal contract sets c > 0 just sufﬁciently
high so as to extract all consumer surplus. Given the optimal choice of c > 0 in the latter case, the
lender’s subsequent decision whether to approve credit is second-best efﬁcient: h  ¼ hSB.
The insight in Proposition 3 is thus that endogenous costs of bankruptcy that arise
from the inclusion of assets that must be liquidated below value in case of bankruptcy
are different from exogenous costs of bankruptcy, which are captured by c. As Proposi-
tion 3 shows, if it is possible to adjust the amount of assets that are used as collateral
continuously, then assets will only be pledged if the lender is too conservative, not if the
lender is too aggressive.
However, in some cases the inclusion of assets is clearly either exogenous, as they are
non-exempt, or can only be undertaken in a lumpy way. Intuitively, given that the
household’s loss from defaulting is then equal to c þ c, the lender will be too aggressive
if au < c þ c holds.
4.3. Policy Responses
My model with its novel feature that a lender may be better informed than households
may shed new light on some of the policy recommendations that have been discussed
in the literature on consumer lending. To start with, my results so far point to market
power as a potential culprit for too aggressive lending. A policy option may thus be to
impose an upper boundary   R on the total repayment.
12
Proposition 4. If the lender was previously too aggressive, then the imposition of a (not too
low) cap R     R would increase the household’s expected utility and welfare. Otherwise, if the lender
was too conservative, the cap would reduce welfare but would have an ambiguous effect on
consumer surplus.
12 One way to impose such a constraint on lenders could be to introduce or to strengthen an existing usury
law. For instance, in the US the state of Carolina has recently modiﬁed its usury law provisions to curb
predatory lending practices. Stopping short of imposing a cap on loan rates, the legislation contains a
deﬁnition of high cost home loans, on which special requirements are imposed.
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reasons if, otherwise, the lender is too aggressive. First, a lower R directly beneﬁts the
household if it does not default. Second, as h  is pushed upwards, the set of types h at
which the household receives a loan against its best interest shrinks. If the lender is
already too conservative, however, then a lower value of R makes the lender even more
conservative, creating a trade-off for the household between a lower repayment
requirement and a lower likelihood of obtaining credit in the ﬁrst place.
Researchers – more so than policy makers – have also frequently discussed the
possibility of letting debtors waive some of their rights in case of default, in particular
the right to have their debt discharged by ﬁling for personal bankruptcy.
13 However
Aghion and Hermalin (1990) have argued that from a welfare perspective, it can be
beneﬁcial to force privately informed borrowers to pool at less onerous terms in case
of default. With a better informed lender, the implications are as follows.
Proposition 5. Suppose we allow households to waive their rights and, thereby, make it
possible to pledge all future income credibly. Then the household is made strictly worse off if the
lender’s contract requires such a waiver. Such a clause is only imposed if the lender is otherwise too
conservative, though it will not fully eliminate the lender’s conservatism.
The possibility of defaulting strategically imposes a cap on R, which if it binds ensures
that not all consumer surplus can be extracted by the lender. If this is possible, the
lender’s offer would force the householder to waive his rights. Somewhat surprisingly,
the lender will then still be too conservative, which would clearly not be the case
without private information on h.
4.4. The Role of Monopoly Power
As the arguments following Proposition 1 suggest, the result that lending can be too
aggressive should be sensitive to the lender’s degree of market power. I explore this in
two steps. While I investigate a fully speciﬁed model of competition in more detail
below, for the moment I take a simpler route to capture competitive pressure. In the
spirit of the literature on contestable markets, as in Baumol and Willig (1981), I now
suppose that the lender’s offer must maximise the household’s expected payoff. This is
the case if it generates
Umax :¼ max
R
Z   h
h
  UðhÞf ðhÞdh
"#
: ð7Þ
Note that in (7) the repayment R affects the borrower’s expected utility both directly
via the utility u   R in the case of high income and indirectly via the threshold h . The
only change to the lender’s programme is then to replace the borrower’s participation
constraint (5) by the requirement that
Z   h
h 
UðhÞf ðhÞdh   Umax: ð8Þ
13 Though this is a common theme in the literature – see, e.g., Schwartz (1997) – I am not aware of any
country where such waivers would be legally enforceable.
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Proposition 6. If the lender’s offer must satisfy the new participation constraint (8), then the
lender is always too conservative (h  > hSB).
Once the lender must leave the household with a sufﬁciently high surplus, the lender
ceases to be too aggressive. Instead, if the constraint imposed by the market is sufﬁ-
ciently strong, then the lender may now even become too conservative.
Taking the interpretation of a contestable market somewhat literally, a comparison
of Propositions 1 and 6 suggests that the likelihood with which a given household
receives credit is higher under an unconstrained monopoly. This somewhat counter-
intuitive result comes, however, with an important caveat. My model does not contain a
standard monopoly pricing problem. This could, for instance, arise if households were
privately informed about their consumption beneﬁt from the asset. By choosing a
higher R, an unconstrained monopolist would then exclude some households, creating
less credit and a higher deadweight loss.
4.5. A Model of Competition
In this Section, I consider a simple model of competition where the current incum-
bent lender faces competition from entrants. Crucially, entrants information is only as
precise as that of households.
The analysis of games with simultaneous offers from differentially informed lenders
is typically plagued with non-existence of equilibria in pure strategies.
14 My way
around this is to stipulate that a household who, after observing both the incum-
bent’s and the entrants offers, turns to a particular lender is forced to take up the
respective loan offer once he has been approved. (Compare, however, the analysis in
Section 5.)
Furthermore, I now want to distinguish between households with different, com-
monly known ex ante characteristics. For this we introduce a real-valued index n 2½ n;  n 
for the distribution function Fn(h), where the respective densities fn(h) are continuous in
n for all h and satisfy fn(h) > 0 for all h 2 Q and n 2ð n;  nÞ. Higher n are good news in a
standard sense: n shifts the distribution in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP) such that fn0(h)/fn(h) is everywhere strictly increasing in h where
n0 > n. MLRP implies that the household’s ex ante probability of having high income,
pn :¼
Z   h
h
pðhÞfnðhÞds;
is strictly increasing in n. Moreover, for very low n (almost) all probability mass is put
on the lowest type h ¼ h, while for very high n (almost) all probability mass is put on
the highest type h ¼   h. Formally pn ! pðhÞ¼0a sn ! n and pn ! pð  hÞ¼1a sn !   n.
15
14 See, for instance, the discussion in von Thadden (2004). See also Bolton et al. (2003), who there-
fore stipulate that lenders move sequentially.
15 This also uses the fact that all p(h) are ﬁnite. Besides continuity of all fn (and that MLRP holds), I do not
need to make further assumptions on the nature of convergence.
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information the surplus from making a loan would just be zero. That is, at n ¼ ^ n
16
uða þ p^ nÞ¼ð 1   p^ nÞc þ l: ð9Þ
As entrants make their offers to unscreened borrowers, they compete themselves
down to
17
RE ¼ R?
n :¼
l
pn
; ð10Þ
implying that a borrower’s expected payoff would be
U ?
n :¼ uða þ pnÞ ð 1   pnÞc þ l:
Note that from (9), U ?
n   0 only if n   ^ n. The characterisation of an equilibrium is
now rather intuitive. For n   ^ n entrants do not impose a constraint on the lender.
Proposition 1 entails that in this case the lender is too aggressive. At the other extreme,
where n is high, the entrants offer becomes very attractive. In fact, as n !   n such that
pn ! pð  hÞ entrants are willing to lower the required repayment down to
RE ¼ R?
n ! l=pð  hÞ. As there is also little to be gained by screening, the incumbent must
match this offer, in which case the chosen h  clearly exceeds hSB.
Proposition 7. In the game with competition by simultaneous offers, for au < c it is now
only for borrowers with commonly known characteristics n < n  , where ^ n < n
   <   n, that the
incumbent lender’s cutoff is too low, while for all n > n   it is too high. That is, lending is only too
aggressive for borrowers whose alternative offer from the market is sufﬁciently unattractive. For
au > c the incumbent is too conservative for all n, while for au ¼ c lending is second-best efﬁcient
for n   ^ n and too conservative for n > ^ n.
5. Free-riding and Competition
In the game with simultaneous moves, entrants could not free-ride on the incumbent
by poaching approved households. To analyse this possibility, I now allow entrants to
move after the incumbent.
Before fully characterising the equilibrium outcome, I show ﬁrst that competition is
now always sufﬁciently strong to rule out too aggressive lending. This can be easily seen
by arguing to a contradiction. Suppose thus to the contrary that h  < hSB, in which case
a rejected household would strictly prefer not to be granted credit under the incum-
bent’s offer. Hence, when only marginally undercutting the incumbent, an entrant’s
offer attracts only approved households with type h   h  and is thus proﬁtable.
18
16 Existence of ^ n follows from my assumptions on the limits where n !   n and n ! n together with MLRP
and continuity of all fn, where the latter implies continuity of pn.
17 As is standard, I suppose in what follows that for n < ^ n entrants do not offer a lower R
E even if they know
that this would still not attract borrowers.
18 Importantly, this argument and the following results all rely on the fact that households correctly update
their beliefs after being either approved or rejected by the incumbent. If households, instead, naively believe
that lenders are not more sophisticated than they are themselves, I have shown in my working paper Inderst
(2005) that even entrants may then engage in too aggressive lending, namely to those households who were
previously rejected by the better informed incumbent.
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Case I: In this case, the free-riding problem is extreme and there will be no lending
in equilibrium. Here, for any offer R
I that would be attractive to households, entrants
can always make a marginally better offer so as to poach an approved household.
Case II: In this case, the incumbent can make a defensive offer that ensures that
entrants cannot free ride by poaching approved households. The incumbent’s offer is
now chosen such that any lower offer R
E < R
I would not allow entrants to break even as
a rejected household would also take up the offer. The optimal defensive offer is
uniquely determined and, for given n, denoted by RD
n . (A formal deﬁnition is provided
in the Proof of Proposition 8.)
Case III: In this case, the incumbent’s offer is determined by the constraint that
entrants are willing to offer a repayment requirement as low as R?
n , as deﬁned in (10), if
this attracts a household irrespective of whether its credit was approved by the
incumbent. Case III has two subcases. In the ﬁrst subcase, Case IIIa, only the incum-
bent will make a loan in equilibrium – just as in the previous Case II. In Case IIIb,
entrants offer a contract that only attracts a rejected household. Consequently, in Case
IIIb a household will borrow with probability one – either from the incumbent (and at a
lower rate) or from the entrants (and at a higher rate).
When do the different cases arise? As the household’s exante probability of default
decreases, i.e., as n increases, we gradually move from Case I to Case II and ﬁnally to Case
III. This is intuitive. To see this, take ﬁrst the two extreme cases: Case I and Case IIIb.
For low n, a rejected household will be quite pessimistic about his probability of
default. This makes it easy for entrants to undercut the incumbent while still ensuring
that only an approved household takes up their offer. At the other extreme is Case IIIb,
which arises for high n. Here, even a rejected borrower has now a sufﬁciently low
expected probability of default to make an offer ﬁnancially viable for entrants, though
the required repayment will be higher than in the incumbent’s offer. In the inter-
mediate cases, that is in Case II and in Case IIIa, only households whose application was
approved by the incumbent receive credit. The household’s expected probability of
default is neither sufﬁciently high to give rise to the aforementioned extreme form of
free-riding nor sufﬁciently low to make it proﬁtable for entrants to only target a
rejected household.
Proposition 8. Suppose that under sequential competition the incumbent lender moves ﬁrst.
Then as n increases, thus making it less likely that the household will default, we move successively
from Case I to Case IIIb. Formally, there exist three cutoffs n
0 < ^ n < n
00 < n
000 such that Case I
applies for n 2ð n;n
0Þ, Case II applies for n 2 (n0,n00), Case IIIa applies for n 2 (n00,n000), and
Case IIIb applies for n 2ð n
000;  nÞ.
19
In Case IIIb, where a household always receives a loan either from the incumbent or
the entrant, the informed lender no longer performs a socially valuable screening
function. The only use of its better information is to allow him to extract strictly positive
proﬁts from the market, which reduces a household’s exante utility. As is easy to show, a
19 Note that I exclude the boundary cases where n ¼ n and n ¼   n, which have degenerate probability
distributions. Also, when n takes the value of one of the three thresholds there are multiple equilibria.
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though a household with a lower h will be worse off.
6. Conclusion
I show that even if households are perfectly rational, better informed lenders can
engage in too aggressive lending if they enjoy sufﬁcient market power. In this case, too
aggressive lending arises naturally from a lender’s attempt to extract more of the
consumer surplus.
As discussed in detail in the Introduction, the claim that some lending is irre-
sponsible or predatory is frequently made both in the US and Europe. My contri-
bution is to show that such lending practices can be perfectly rational even if
households do not make systematic errors. Moreover, I link the prevalence of too
aggressive lending to market power. In my model, too aggressive lending may fully
disappear even if competitive pressure is exerted only by lenders that do not share the
incumbent lender’s information advantage. However, this may not increase consumer
surplus or welfare. First, I show that competition can make lenders too conservative.
Second, the possibility of free-riding on the incumbent may make it impossible to
harness his better information.
My model is simple in concept. The main justiﬁcation for this is to focus the analysis
on the novel feature: the information gap between the (incumbent) lender and the
household. For instance, an extension to more than two periods together with risk
aversion could provide further insights into the optimal contract design for personal
loans. A less obvious, though in my view potentially more important, shortcoming of my
analysis is that in reality personal loan contracts, including mortgages, are often
solicited by third-party agents, whose interests may diverge substantially from the
institution that approves or ultimately holds the loan. In fact, cases of too aggressive
lending seem to be more often than not associated with (asserted) misbehaviour of
these agents such as brokerage ﬁrms.
20 In a related model of expert advice, Inderst and
Ottaviani (2007) consider such opportunistic behaviour of agents. One of the key
insights is that more competition may then lead to more misselling: the act where a
household follows advice and takes out a loan even though this is not in its own best
interest.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: It is helpful to restate the lender’s programme fully. The lender chooses
R to maximise his expected payoff V subject to
(i) the borrower’s participation constraint (5), where the threshold h  is chosen (expost)
optimally by the lender such that V(h ) ¼ 0, and subject to
(ii) the constraint that R   minfu þ c;  yg.
As noted in the main text, I always assume that   y is sufﬁciently high such that the constraint
R     y will not bind. (Formally, this is the case whenever   y > u þ c.)
20 See, for instance, the introductory examples in Renuart (2004) for the US.
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that u   R >   c as otherwise (5) would not be satisﬁed. I show next that (5) binds at an
optimum. To see this, note ﬁrst that by continuity of p(h)U(h) and V(h) are also continuous in h.
This also implies that h , which is deﬁned by V(h ) ¼ 0, is continuous in R such that ﬁnally the
borrower’s expected utility E[U(h) j h   h ] is also continuous in R. As the lender’s payoff V is
strictly increasing in R, it is thus uniquely optimal for the lender to choose the highest possible R
such that E[U(h) j h   h ] ¼ 0 is satisﬁed with equality. (Note that E[U(h) j h   h ] may not be
monotonic in R over the relevant range of R.) U(h ) < 0 and h  < hSB follows then from the
arguments in the main text.
Suppose next that au   c. In this case, the unique optimal contract for the lender is to extract
as much as possible in t ¼ 1 by setting R ¼ u þ c. As is easily checked, this implies that (5) then
holds with equality for au ¼ c, while (5) is slack for au > c. When au ¼ c, U(h) ¼ 0 for all h 2 Q
and thus, in particular, at h ¼ hSB, implying that V(hSB) ¼ 0 and thus h  ¼ hSB. When au > c,
U(h) ¼ au   c > 0 for all h 2 Q and thus, in particular, at h ¼ hSB, implying that V(hSB) < 0 and
thus by strict monotonicity and continuity of V(h) that h  > hSB.
Proof of Proposition 2: I can restrict consideration to the case where with a ¼ 0 lending would be
too aggressive. Hence, if I substitute from V(h ) ¼ 0 into the binding participation constraint, I
have a unique value h  < hSB satisfying the requirement
Z   h
h
  pðhÞ u  
l
pðh
 Þ
  
 ½ 1   pðhÞ c
  
f ðhÞdh ¼ 0: ð11Þ
Note that uniqueness follows immediately as from p(h )u   [1   p(h )]c   l < 0 the left-hand
side is strictly increasing in h . If we allow for a > 0, implying that h  is determined by V(h ) ¼ 0
with V(h): ¼ p(h)R   (l þ a), then by analogy to (11)
Z   h
h
  pðhÞ u þ a  
l þ a
pðh
 Þ
  
þ½ 1   pðhÞ ða   cÞ
  
f ðhÞdh ¼ 0: ð12Þ
As long as h  < hSB, the left-hand side of (12) is again strictly increasing in h . Denoting the
derivative by D > 0, then, from (12)
dh
 
da
¼
R   h
h
 
pðhÞ pðh
 Þ
pðh
 Þ
  
f ðhÞdh
D
> 0: ð13Þ
As the lender extracts all surplus, it is thus optimal to increase a further as long as still h  < hSB
holds. Through setting a ¼ c and thereby ensuring that U(h) ¼ 0 holds for all h, this ultimately
gives h  ¼ hSB.
Proof of Proposition 3: For au > c, with c ¼ 0 the household realises U(h) ¼ au   c > 0 for all
h. Recall that the lender’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in R. Consequently, it is always
optimal for the lender to increase R as far as possible, that is until either (5) or R   u þ c þ c
becomes binding such that c ¼ au þ c and R ¼ u þ c þ c. This implies U(h) ¼ 0 for all h 2 Q
and thus h  ¼ hSB, where hSB depends on c according to p(hSB)u(1 þ a) ¼ [1   p(hSB)]
[c þ c(1   b)].
Supposenextthatau < c.Ishowthatc ¼ 0isthenuniquelyoptimalas,otherwise,h  < hSBwould
be even further pushed down. Denote now h (R, c) and l(h): ¼ p(h)u   [1   p(h)]c. Substituting
the deﬁnition of h (R, c) into the borrower’s binding participation constraint (5), gives
Z   h
h
 ðR;cÞ
lðhÞf ðhÞdh ¼ð R   bcÞ
Z   h
h
 ðR;cÞ
fpðhÞ p½h
 ðR;cÞ gf ðhÞdh: ð14Þ
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where in both cases (14) is satisﬁed with equality. h (R0, c0) < h (R, c) follows then from
R   bc > R 0   bc 0 and (14), together with l(h) < 0 for all h < hSB and the fact that
h (R, c) < hSB, which in turn follows from Proposition 1 and as, by assumption, au < c.
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that for au < c the participation constraint (5) is satisﬁed with
equality. I now consider a marginal reduction in R, which by the arguments in Proposition 1 leads
to a marginal increase in h . Given that h  < hSB holds under the (uncapped) monopoly offer,
this strictly increases total surplus. To see that the household’s utility also strictly increases, note
that U(h) is strictly decreasing in R for all h 2 Q and that U(h) < 0 holds for all h sufﬁciently close
to h  < hSB.
For au > c where h  > hSB, a reduction in R leads to a further increase in h  and thus
reduces total surplus. Differentiating
R   h
h
  UðhÞf ðhÞdh next w.r.t. R, gives
 
Z   h
h
  pðhÞ
f ðhÞ
1   Fðh
 Þ
dh   UðhSBÞ
dh
 
dR
; ð15Þ
where after implicit differentiation of p(h
 )R   l ¼ 0 I can substitute dh /dR < 0. The derivative
(15) reveals that the impact is in general ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 5: If the repayment constraint was not binding previously as au   c, then
for the lender there is no need to impose the additional clause. If instead au > c and if the
lender can now increase R further until the household’s participation constraint (5) binds, then
this is optimal and implies also that R > u þ c. Consequently, U(h) becomes strictly decreasing,
implying U(h ) > 0, which together with V(h ) ¼ 0 ﬁnally implies that still h  > hSB.
Proof of Proposition 6: Note ﬁrst that by the argument from Proposition 1, the household’s
participation constraint binds:
R   h
h  UðhÞf ðhÞdh ¼ Umax. Recall also that h  is strictly decreasing and
continuous in R. As long as h
  < hSB;
R   h
h
  UðhÞf ðhÞdh is strictly decreasing in R, which follows as
U(h) is strictly decreasing in R for all h 2 Q and as U(h) < 0 holds for all h sufﬁciently close to h .
It thus remains to show that a further (marginal) decrease of R at h  ¼ hSB is also optimal. This
follows immediately from the envelope theorem. Formally, at h  ¼ hSB
21
d
dR
Z   h
h  UðhÞf ðhÞdh
"#
¼ 
Z   h
h  pðhÞf ðhÞdh   UðhSBÞ
dh
 
dR
;
where I can substitute U(hSB) ¼ 0.
Proof of Proposition 7: We focus on the case where au < c. (Those with au >,c and au ¼ c then
follow immediately.) As entrants make the offer characterised in (10), the incumbent’s offer is
the highest value at which
Z   h
h
 
n
UðhÞpðhÞfnðhÞds   max U ?
n ;0
  
ð16Þ
just holds with equality.
22 For n   ^ n, where the right-hand side of (16) is zero, from Proposition 1
h
 
n < hSB. I argue next that h
 
n > hSB must hold for all sufﬁciently high n. For this note ﬁrst that, as
21 I can substitute dh /dR < 0 from implicitly differentiating the deﬁnition of h , from which it holds that
p(h )R   l ¼ 0.
22 As I am only interested in the case where the incumbent can make a sufﬁciently attractive offer, I can
focus on the case where (16) can be satisﬁed. Generally, as the incumbent always extracts positive proﬁts, for
high n this need not hold.
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n ! l=pð  hÞ such that the right-hand side of (16) converges
to u½a þ pð  hÞ    ½1   pð  hÞ c   l. As for h    hSB, the offer of the incumbent must be bounded
from below by l=pðhSBÞ > l=pð  hÞ, (16) cannot be satisﬁed for all sufﬁciently high n unless
hn
  > hSB.
The asserted threshold n   then exists if I can show that h
 
n is strictly increasing in n, which
holds if RI
n is strictly decreasing. I prove this by showing ﬁrst that holding RI
n constant as n is
marginally increased, (16) would no longer be satisﬁed. Deﬁne the entrants offer as
^ U E
n ðhÞ :¼ au þ pðhÞðu   R?
n Þ ½ 1   pðhÞ c and the incumbent’s offer as ^ U I
n ðhÞ :¼ UðhÞ for h   h
 
n
(evaluated at R ¼ RI
n) and ^ U I
n ðhÞ :¼ 0 for h < h
 
n. Next, deﬁne DnðhÞ :¼ ^ U E
n ðhÞ  ^ U I
n ðhÞ, which is
equal to pðhÞ½RI
n   R?
n   for h   h
 
n and equal to ^ U I
n ðhÞ for h < h
 
n. Note that Dn(h) is strictly
increasing in h and that
R   h
h DnðhÞfnðhÞds ¼ 0 holds from the binding constraint (16). As n is
increased while holding both contracts constant, (16) is no longer satisﬁed. Formally, this holds
as Fn satisﬁes strict First-Order Stochastic Dominance (as implied by MLRP). The assertion follows
then after observing that also the true value of R?
n strictly decreases, which even further increases
the right-hand side of (16).
Proof of Proposition 8: It is now sometimes helpful to make the dependency of the lender’s
cutoff on the loan contract explicit by writing h (R) and to denote the household’s utility by
U(h, R). Note now ﬁrst that by offering R
E ¼ R
I   e for any e > 0 entrants can always attract an
approved household. An offer R
E will in turn not be strictly preferred by a rejected household if
Z h
 ðRIÞ
h
Uðh;REÞ
fnðhÞ
Fn h
 ðRIÞ ½ 
dh   0: ð17Þ
Taken together, it is thus not possible for entrants to make an offer that is strictly preferred by
an approved but not so by a rejected household, if and only if the incumbent’s offer satisﬁes
Z h
 ðRIÞ
h
Uðh;RIÞ
fnðhÞ
Fn h
 ðRIÞ ½ 
dh   0: ð18Þ
I argue ﬁrst that the left-hand side of (18) is strictly decreasing in R
I. To see this, note that a
higher R
I strictly reduces U(h,R
I) for all h   h (R
I). Moreover, as a higher R
I also reduces h (R
I),
the assertion follows as the conditional probability of non-defaulting in case h   h (R
I) is strictly
increasing in h (R
I). Note next that from p(h) ¼ 0 the left-hand side of (18) is surely strictly
negative for all h  sufﬁciently close to h (and thus for all sufﬁciently high R
I). I must distinguish
between different cases. In the ﬁrst case, the left-hand side of (18) is strictly positive at
RI ¼ l=pð  hÞ, i.e., it holds that for given n
pn u  
l
pð  hÞ
  
 ð 1 nÞc > 0: ð19Þ
In this case, there is a unique value of R
I at which the left-hand side of (18) is just equal to zero.
I denote this value for given n by RN
n , which clearly satisﬁes h
 ðRN
n Þ > hSB.
Claim 1. If (19) does not hold, it is not possible for the incumbent to make an offer R
I that,
given the entrants optimal response, ensures that an approved household stays with the
incumbent. If (19) holds, then RI ¼ RN
n is the highest possible offer that will ensure that entrants
cannot make a counteroffer that only attracts an approved household.
When does (19) hold?
Claim 2. There exists a threshold n < n
0 < ^ n such that (19) holds if and only if n > n0.
Proof. Recall ﬁrst that pn is strictly increasing in n. Moreover, as pn ! p(h) ¼ 0 for n ! n, the
converse of (19) holds strictly for all sufﬁciently low n. Moreover, by deﬁnition of ^ n (19) holds at
n ¼ ^ n. As the left-hand side of (19) is also continuous in n (by continuity of pn), there is thus a
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0 < ^ n at which (19) holds with equality, while it holds strictly for all n > n0 and
the converse of it holds strictly for all n < n0.
For all n satisfying (19), I next compare RN
n with R?
n .
Claim 3. There exists a threshold ^ n < n
00 <   n such that RN
n ¼ R?
n holds at n ¼ n00, while
RN
n < R?
n holds for n0 < n < n00 and RN
n > R?
n holds for n > n00.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that RN
n ¼ R?
n holds if and only if p½h
 ðRN
n Þ  ¼ pn, while RN
n < R?
n (RN
n > R?
n )
holds if and only if p½h
 ðRN
n Þ  > pn (p½h
 ðRN
n Þ  < pn). By deﬁnition of n; R?
n is strictly decreasing in
n (and continuous by continuity of pn). I argue next that RN
n is strictly increasing in n. To see this,
note ﬁrst that for some ﬁxed R
I and thus ﬁxed h (R
I) the term in (18) is strictly increasing in n.
This follows from the MLRP of Fn and as U(h,R
I) is strictly increasing in h.
23 Given that (18) is also
strictly decreasing in R
I (holding n ﬁxed this time), we thus have that a higher n must lead to a
higher RN
n . (Recall that for RI ¼ RN
n (18) is satisﬁed with equality.) That RN
n is also continuous in
n follows next from continuity of all fn(h).
Hence, to conclude the proof of Claim 3 it remains to show that p½h
 ðRN
n Þ  > pn holds for all n
close to ^ n while p½h
 ðRN
n Þ  < pn holds for all n close to   n. This follows as by deﬁnition of RN
n for
n ! ^ n that h
 ðRN
n Þ!  h, while for n !   n;pn ! pð  hÞ > pðh
 ðRN
n ÞÞ. QED
From Claim 3, for all n0 < n < n00 the unique equilibrium offer of the incumbent is RI ¼ RN
n .
Given that RN
n < R?
n holds in this case, entrants can also not proﬁtably target only the rejected
household.
TocompletetheproofofProposition8,itthusremainstoconsiderthecasewheren > n00.There,
theincumbentcannolongerofferRN
n andmakestrictlypositiveproﬁts.Inthiscase,entrantscould
counter with an offer RE ¼ R?
n   e for some e > 0, which would attract all households and, given
thatn
00 > ^ n,would allowentrants tobreakeven.Hence,for alln > n00theincumbent’s offer cannot
behigher than R?
n . Given that R?
n < RN
n it is also not possible in this case for entrants to poach only
the approved household, implying that the unique equilibrium offer for the incumbent is now
RI ¼ R?
n .
For the entrants offer there are now two subcases to distinguish (namely, Cases IIIa and IIIb).
If it is feasible for entrants to make an acceptable offer to a rejected household, then competition
ensures that
REl=
Z h ðR?
n Þ
h
fnðhÞ
Fn h
 ðR?
n Þ
hi pðhÞdh; ð20Þ
where I substituted RI ¼ R?
n . Deﬁning
pR
n :¼
Z h ðR?
n Þ
h
fnðhÞ
Fn h
 ðR?
n Þ
hi pðhÞdh;
the entrants offer from (20) is only acceptable to a rejected household
23 To be precise, partial differentiation of (13) shows that a sufﬁcient condition for this to hold is that
fn(h)/Fn(h) is strictly increasing in n for all interior h. This holds in turn if, for two given n1 > n2fn2(h)/
fn1(h) > Fn2(h)/Fn1(h). To see that this is ﬁnally implied by MLRP, note that from fn(h) > 0 for all
h 2 Q, Fn2(h)/Fn1(h) ! fn2(h)/fn1(h)a sh ! h, while clearly for h ¼   h MLRP requires that
fn2ð  hÞ=fn1ð  hÞ > Fn2ð  hÞ=Fn1ð  hÞ¼1. Note next that at any h where fn2(h)/fn1(h) ¼ Fn2(h)/Fn1(h) holds with
equality, the derivative of the right-hand side is just zero (the sign is given by Fn1(h)fn2(h)   Fn2(h)fn1(h)), while
the derivative of the left-hand side is strictly positive by MLRP. (I use differentiability only for convenience at
this point.) Hence, I have shown that for all h > h the graph of fn2(h)/fn1(h) must always lie above that of
Fn2(h)/Fn1(h).
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n u þð 1   pR
n Þc   l: ð21Þ
Consequently, whenever (21) holds strictly, a household that was previously rejected by the
incumbent receives a loan from an entrant. If the converse of (21) holds strictly, then a rejected
household does not take out a loan.
I ﬁnally ask when condition (21) holds. Observe ﬁrst that the left-hand side of (21) is strictly
increasing in n. To see this, recall that R?
n is strictly decreasing such that h
 ðR?
n Þ is strictly
increasing. Consequently, together with the MLRP of Fn the conditional probability pR
n
is strictly increasing in n (footnote 22). By continuity of all fn it is also continuous in n. Next,
at n ¼ n00 by deﬁnition RI ¼ RN
n ¼ R?
n , implying that RE < R?
n would not attract the rejected
household and thus (21) cannot hold. Hence, a unique threshold n ¼ n000 with n
00 < n
000 <   n at
which (21) holds with equality exists if (21) holds for all sufﬁciently high n. This, however, follows
as for n !   n;pn ! pð  hÞ such that R?
n ! l=pð  hÞ and h
  !   h.
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